Abstract: Several leading indicators of corruption point to a fairly serious problem in India on whole. Yet what explains the substantial variance of corruption levels perceived and experienced by citizens across Indian states? Surprisingly little research in the field has addressed this important question. This analysis elucidates a number of relevant and testable hypotheses from the growing literature on the determinants of corruption and applies them to the case of the Indian states. The estimates of the empirical models show that the level of development -measured both in economic and education terms -and the level of fiscal decentralization are significant and negatively related with levels of corruption. Factors such as income inequality, religious fractionalization, media exposure are statistically insignificant.
"Corruption and hypocrisy ought not to be inevitable products of democracy, as they undoubtedly are today" Mahatma Gandhi
Corruption in the public sector hinders economic growth (Mauro 1995; Bliss and Di Tella 1997) , reduces trust, legitimacy and social capital (Rothstein and Stolle 2008) and leads to greater political instability (Anderson and Tverdova 2003) while systematically hurting the poor, by reducing the efficiency of the provision of public goods to citizens 1 .
According to several sources ranking countries on corruption, India, a transitioning country in many respects yet a stable democracy, generally ranks among the middle to lower half of countries surveyed in multiple samples 2 . On its face, relative most other countries, it would seem that India generally has a moderate to large problem with corruption as a country on whole (Quah 2008) . While this may indeed be the case, as a strong federal country with a relatively high degree of political and fiscal decentralization, corruption levels are not monolithic across the country, and in fact, rent- This analysis seeks to elucidate the determinants of corruption in Indian states by employing the largest in-country survey ever conducted on citizen perceptions and experience with corruption. In 2005, more than 14,000 citizens in 20 of India's 28 states were asked about their personal experiences and perceptions with corruption in the public sector for services that are provided by state-level governments. Upon surveying the literature of the determinants of corruption, I test five hypotheses for which data is available and that appear to apply well to the case of India. Based on the findings in the empirical analysis, I report thee significant factors that receive strong empirical support.
One, wealthier states are less corrupt on average. Two, states with higher levels of education are less corrupt than those with lower aggregate levels. Finally, states that are more fiscally decentralized, in that they are more reliant on their own citizens for revenues rather than federal transfers, are less corrupt than those which are more dependent on the federal government for funds.
The remainder of this analysis goes as follows. In the next two sections I review the literature on the determinants of corruption, beginning briefly by discussing the findings of several other studies looking at corruption at the sub-national level.
Additionally, in this section I elucidate five testable hypotheses. Next I discuss in detail the survey data which is used as the dependent variable of the study, followed by the data used to test the hypotheses. Subsequently, I report the findings of the cross-section analysis and show a number of bivariate analyses. I conclude with a summary of the results and some policy recommendations based on the findings.
EXPLANATIONS OF CORRUPTION IN SUB-NATIONAL GOVERNEMNTS
What of course makes the sub-national level of analysis attractive is the idea that many of the oftentimes complex control variables, such levels of democracy, rule of law, From this literature, along with a vast cross-section literature on the determinants of corruption, I draw on five hypotheses which I test that are of particular interest and applicability to the Indian states.
ADDITIONAL LITERATURE AND THE HYPOTHESES

Higher Levels of Income and Education
In most all studies of the determinants of corruption -whether at the national or subnational level -studies have found that most affluent and better educated countries or regions are associated with lower levels of corruption. Essentially, the theoretical foundations for this hypothesis come from Lipset's theory of modernization (Lipset 1960) combined with the standard principle-agent model oftentimes employed in the corruption literature (Rose-Ackerman 1975) . Lipset posits that as citizens (the agents) become wealthier and better educated they will be more capable of monitoring their public representatives (the principle). Due to the greater likelihood of being caught, incentives are reduced for politicians and bureaucrats to engage in rent-seeking behaviour. The higher levels of wealth also give more citizens the resources to mobilize and take action against corrupt public officials. This sentiment is essentially echoed by Huntington (1968) 
Income Inequality Hypothesis
Although admittedly it is next to impossible to distinguish a distinct causal direction between these two variables, inequality and corruption are expected to be related.
Several recent studies have demonstrated a significant relationship between these two variable, with some finding that corruption has a positive effect on income inequality (Gupta et al 2002; Gyimah-Brempong 2002) and others showing support that inequality increases corruption, in particular in democratic states (You and Khagram 2004) . The argument as to why these two forces are related is rather strait-forward. In areas that are more unequal, more of the citizens will of course be poorer, which should compel them to pressure the state for greater redistribution, which would come from taxing the wealthier class (Meltzer and Richard 1983) . In response to redistributive pressures, the wealthy have greater incentives to engage in political corruption to avoid paying higher tax along with bureaucratic corruption to avoid tax payments. In this scenario, the poorer citizens have fewer resources to keep the wealthy in check or monitor their behavior and are likely to receive poor services such as health and education from the state. They are thus themselves more likely to be dependent on petty corruption to receive services because bureaucrats are in a better position to extort them in exchange for basic public services (You and Khagram 2004) . Additionally, You and Khargram (2004) show that in democracies, inequality is likely to have a greater impact on corruption than in dictatorships because the wealthier classes are forced to rely on corruption over repression of the masses. Further, the greater number the poor, the more opportunities for vote buying during a political campaign. Based on this, we would anticipate that on average, higher levels of income inequality in Indian states are associated with higher levels of corruption.
The Effect of Decentralization on Corruption
The impact of decentralization -whether political, financial or administrative -on corruption is a hotly contested topic. India is a long-time federal system with state-level elected official and parliaments which are represented by both national and regional parties. Today it contains a total of 28 states and 7 unit territories, most of which under the States Reorganization Act in 1956 were draw around linguistic lines 5 . Each state is primarily responsible for issues such as law enforcement, education, public works and services, and hospital care within their borders. On the one hand, Tanzi (2001) and others argue that fiscal decentralization might lead to greater levels of corruption, especially in developing countries, because local leaders are expected to be less competent than those at the national level and might be more prone to clientalism because of closer and more frequent contact with citizens. Moreover, the lines of responsibility are more blurred than in a strict unitary, centralized system, thus voters do become more confused regarding to whom they should assign blame for corrupt politics. Gerring and
Thacker (2004) find empirical evidence in a cross-sectional study supporting this argument with respect to political decentralization.
On the other hand, the greater the political or fiscal decentralization, the closer the voters come to their politicians, which should increase accountability, encourage responsible governance and reduce corruption. Provincially elected governments that are more responsible for collecting their own revenues via citizens in their state should be less inclined to rent-seeking than a regional government that is mainly subsidized by the central government -meaning that public officials are less accountable for their funds and policies. Fisman and Gatti (2002) and Gurgur and Shah (2005) find empirical evidence for greater levels of decentralization being associated with lower corruption levels. However, most of the tests of this hypothesis have been conducted using national level data on corruption and aggregated levels of various types of decentralization. India provides an excellent test case in that there are substantial variations in the level of decentralization -in particular fiscal decentralization -among the states. Thus it will be fruitful and interesting to test whether greater levels of in-state fiscal responsibility are correlated with higher or lower corruption across the sample.
The Media
Several studies have argued and found empirical evidence to support the idea that countries with greater media access and an independent free press have lower corruption at the national level, ceteris paribus (Brunetti and Weder 2003; Lindstedt and Naurin 2005; Ahrend 2002) . At the provincial level, Ferraz and Finan (2008) and Francken et al (2005) demonstrate the media's pivotal role in helping curb corruption in certain regions due to higher volume of radio listeners in Brazil and Madagascar respectively. Since this analysis is examining a sample of state within one country, variations in press freedom are expected to be low to non-existent across regions. However, one might expect that states with higher levels of media consumption might have a more informed public on political matters, thus building a population that is better suited to monitor and penalize corrupt behaviour in the public sector.
DATA AND RESEARCH DESIGN The Survey
The 'Indian Corruption states (and the capital region of Delhi) with respect to population (the exception being that Uttarakhand is more populous than Himachal Pradesh) and that for budgetary reasons they were not able to reach the entire country thus they wanted to maximize the amount of citizens represented 6 . The surveyors received between 527 and 960 respondents for each state. In the majority of states, the distribution of respondents is skewed towards urban citizens by roughly a 2-1 ratio (see Table 2 ). The structure of the interviews was 'face to face', thus the surveyors could include anyone in the sample, not just those who were literate.
The focus of the study was on corruption in the public sector. More specifically, it intended to capture the level of 'petty corruption' that the 'common man' faced in obtaining 11 different public services such as: Income tax bureaucracy, municipal services, judiciary, the Rural Financial Institution (RFI), Land Administration, police, public schools, water suppliers, electricity suppliers, government hospitals and rationcard suppliers. The survey does not contain information regarding the extent to which a business must pay a bribe in order to obtain a permit or the extent to which high level 'state capture'-type corruption exists. However, the content of the survey lends itself quite nicely to a comparison of state-by-state levels of corruption in India in that it is the provincial and local governments in India -not the central government -that mainly provide these services in question. Additionally, another advantage of the survey method in corruption analysis is that it does not rely as much on the comparative strength of the legal systems across states as much as a 'hard measure', such as the number of yearly convictions for example.
The methodology of the survey was also unique in the sense that it based the results on both perceptions of petty corruption and actual experiences with having to pay 'extra money' to obtain basic services. Secondly, the survey also obtained information regarding the outlook of the service provider. On the later point, the researchers wanted to find out certain aspects of the service providers, such as how monopolistic the services were, how often the bureaucrats interacted with the public, and how essential the services are the average person.
*** Table 1 here*** It essentially measures the likelihood that two random people drawn from a particular state will have a different religious affiliation. The index is then subtracted from 1 and has a range of '0' to '1', with higher scores equating higher levels of religious diversity. example. I choose to measure fiscal decentralization in this study as the ratio of each state's self-generate revenue to their total revenues. There are several advantages to this measure. One, it demonstrates the level of fiscal independence (or dependence) each region has from (or on) the central government. Two, states that are using locally generated tax dollars to pay for local government projects and serves should in theory feel like they are more directly accountable for the performance and quality of the output of such services. Conversely, state government that receive a high proportion of their revenues via federal transfers are for all intents and purposes spending the tax dollars of citizens in other regions of the country, and thus the link between the tax-payers and state governments is less direct than in states with a higher proportion of in-state generated revenues. The data on Indian state revenues is taken from Roa (2001).
Hypothesis 5 discusses the impact that the media has on corruption. Since the study is at the state-level, we would not expect variations in press freedoms across state lines to be significant, since the Indian constitution renders Freedom of the Press implicit in the guarantee of freedom of speech and expression 11 . Thus we would expect that the press' impact on corruption would come from variations in access to the media across states.
From the same survey that the IIPS completed in 2007, I take two measures. First, I take the percentage of people who responded that they are exposed to the media at least once a week (via newspaper, radio or television). Second, I take the percentage of household television ownership. Similar to the 'development' index created between literacy and GSP per capita, I combine the two media indicators into a single index, using principle component analysis (PCA) so as to avoid multicollinearity issues in multiple regression 12 .
Finally, India's states vary significantly with respect to size and population. To control for these differences, I include the proportion of urban residents. In addition to this, I also check the statistical relevance of each state's population density. test the impact of the development index (combination between GSP per captia and Literacy rates), and as anticipated, the effect on the dependent variable is strong -a one standard deviation increase is associated with roughly a .70 standard deviation decrease in a state's corruption score. Between models 1-3, H1 receives strong empirical support.
RESULTS
In
Model 4 tests the impact of religious fractionalization on corruption, while model 5
shows the impact of income inequality. The results from testing H1 clearly show that both GSP per capita and literacy rates correlate strongly with the dependent variable, thus to avoid any problems associated with omitted variable bias in the remaining models, I
control for these factors using the development index due to the high level of mulitcollinearity between GSP per capita and literacy rates. The coefficient for religious fractionalization is in fact in the expected direction as anticipated (more religious heterogeneity is associated with more corruption), yet far from statistically significant.
Income inequality in model 5 is in the expected direction in that its sign is negative, yet the coefficient fails to reach the accept level of significance for safe interpretation.
However, in these two models, 'development' remains a strong predictor of corruption, significant at the 99% level of confidence in both models, even with the inclusion of the two additional variables.
Models 6 and 7 examine the effect of fiscal decentralization and media exposure on the dependent variable. I continue to include the development indicator as a control variable in these models as well. Fiscal decentralization, significant at the 95% level of confidence, shows to be a strongly significant estimator of corruption in India, with more self-reliant states having less corruption on average. Conversely, corruption is higher in regions that are more reliant on federal transfers for their revenues. The coefficient shows that a one standard deviation increase in fiscal decentralization equates to a roughly .56 standard deviation decrease in corruption. The impact of fiscal decentralization is almost as large as that of 'development', which is .67 in model 6.
This demonstrates evidence for the idea that a state government will be more accountable to citizens and will be more apt to provide better services because of the more direct fiscal relationship between the tax-payers and sub-national government. In model 7, the two measures (TV ownership and greater exposure to the media) are combined into the single measure 'media exposure'. Using these measures, I test whether greater access to the media has a significant impact on corruption level in the Indian states. According to the model, there appears to be no relationship between the proportion of TV ownership and those with weekly exposure to news media on corruption 13 .
Despite the relatively limited degrees of freedom and potential multicollinearity issues, model 8 includes all variables to see how 'development' and fiscal decentralization stand up to the inclusion of the other three indicators. Although the statistical significance of the development variable drops to 90% in model 8, both H1 and H4 still receive a good deal of empirical support despite the inclusion of the urban-rural control, religious fractionalization, income inequality and the media exposure index.
According to the coefficients, the development index has the largest impact on corruption From these results, we can derive two policy recommendations. Although it is unrealistic to simply tell a government to 'grow economically', the findings do suggest that more literacy though education and more fiscally independent state governments are less corruption. Such measures should be taken into consideration in future fights to curb opportunities for rent-seeking in the public sector. In addition, in the future, TI plans to do another round of surveys. With the enactment of the 'Right to Information Act' of 2005, which intends to force public utilities and services to make their transactions with customers transparent to the public, future research will be able to tell if such a law has had any significant impact on citizens perceptions or experiences with corruption.
While India on whole may score lower on income, education levels and corruption relative to other democracies, there is high degrees of variation within the country that is clearly overlooked when ignoring differences among the states themselves. This studyas well as others that have looked into variations in government performance and corruption at the sub-national level -highlights the importance of expanding this discussion beyond the scope of national politics. 
